The ports differing geographical locations, markets, trade goods, vessels, voyages and war impacts all played a role in Liverpool’s subversion of Bristol. The decision-making and business capabilities of the merchants also proved influential in the developments of the ports. This essay argues that most importantly, the Bristolian merchants’ poor economic and market decisions, compared with the exceptional business acumen of Liverpudlian merchants, sealed the fate of both ports. Bristol’s geographical location and new parliamentary legislation acted favourably to propel the town into the slave trade.
The location of the River Severn and Bristol Channel encouraged early involvement in trade over the waterways, stimulating the development of the port city. Contributions to Atlantic trade also initiated Bristol’s role in the sugar trade, following the capture of Jamaica in 1655.  However, increased competition in the trade of sugar thrust Bristol merchants into the trade of slaves. An Act passed in 1698 further encouraged Bristol’s participation in slave trading, stating that any subject of Great Britain could trade to any part of Africa “between Cape Blanco and the Cape of Good Hope”, successfully ending the London Company’s monopoly. 2] Bristol’s geography served to hinder the port’s trading ability, mainly due to difficulties in navigating the meandering River Avon, its wide tidal range, and industrial waste in the river. Geographical location and legislation also contributed to Liverpool’s commencement in the slave trade. Located on the coast in northwest England, Liverpool benefited from close proximity to many industrial and textile producing centres such as Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield. A network of rivers, including the River Mersey, made the port easily accessible to the many incoming and outgoing vessels. 3] The Isle of Man provided a useful off shore base, allowing for trade with Ireland and entry into the contraband trade with Spain. The Grenville Treaty of 1747 soon ended this arrangement, forcing Liverpudlian merchants to consider new options for trade. Utilizing the knowledge and wealth gained from contraband trade, the merchants developed vessels and goods specially suited to the African market, putting them towards gaining entrance to the slave trade.  Small vessels and on board slave revolts lessened the slave carrying capacity and efficiency of Bristol merchants ships.
The smaller size of Bristol vessels perhaps resulted from the winding nature of the River Avon, with navigation difficult for larger ships. The period 1727 to 1769 provides an example of seventy Bristol vessels, one at fifty tons, thirteen at fifty-one to seventy-one tons, and thirty-eight at seventy-six to one hundred tons.  Even before Liverpool’s rise, London outshone Bristol in tonnage, 5,925 tons to 4,250 tons at a value of 137,000 to 98,820 pounds Stirling.  The origins of slaves purchased by Bristolians, coupled with lengthy on shore waiting times for slave deliveries, both reduced carrying capacity and efficiency of vessels.
A concentration of suicide prone Ibo slaves and rebellious Ibibio slaves caused many problems. Consequently, merchants received instruction to shackle and bolt slaves from the popular Bight of Biafra region, to reduce the loss of slaves on board vessels.  Liverpool merchants similarly witnessed slave revolts, but they experienced superior carrying capacity and efficiency of vessels. Liverpool specialised in manufacturing fast slaving vessels in the docks of the River Mersey.  Liverpool’s carrying capacity far exceeded that of Bristol, as demonstrated in the 1100 ton Kent of 1773, the largest ship built in Northern England. 9] Such large ships and the capacity of five slaves per two tons, allowed for maximum vessel efficiency, and in 1753, 101 Liverpool vessels managed to carry over 30,000 slaves to the Americas. Poor vessel conditions for slaves resulted from maximising carrying capacities, and up to a third of slaves died.  One renowned incident on board the Zong displays how captains attempted to avoid the loss of slaves: Captain Collingwood threw 132 sickly slaves overboard in order to claim insurance, rather than risk not selling them in the Americas. 11] Unbearable conditions on board also resulted in increased mutinies between 1751 and 1775, which Mannix and Cowley attribute to ruthless Liverpudlians’ efforts to save money by reducing the size of crews on vessels.  Slaving voyages and their destinations impacted greatly on Bristol’s attempts to gain prominence in the slave trade. Bristol’s shorter voyage time gave merchants a distinct advantage over London, and until the 1730s most Bristol voyages travelled to the Bight of Biafra where they encountered little competition. 13] Most Bristol voyages targeted Old Calabar, which oversupplied male slaves, leading to many trading failures. Merchants such as James Rogers only managed a delivery rate of seventy-three per cent from this region.  Bristol destination choices remained conservative, including Angola and the Gold Coast, despite increasing competition there from Liverpool.  The rise of Liverpool caused a vast reduction in voyages made by Bristolians. Jamaican voyages fell from sixty-nine to twenty-five per cent from 1728 to 1730.  As a result, the period of 1786 to 1807 produced only 240 voyages, compared with 2,473 from Liverpool. 17] Voyages direct to Jamaica became a common trend by 1750, with 104 trips taking place between 1749 and 1755, compared with seventy-four voyages following various triangle trade patterns.  Liverpool merchants achieved more numerous and varied voyages and destinations compared with Bristol. Liverpool’s first slave trade voyage departed in 1708, which is a much later entry than Bristol. Despite Bristol’s early advantage and established market destinations, Liverpool succeeded in creating new slaving destinations in areas such as Sierra Leone, Cameroon and Gabon. 19] In contrast with Bristol’s prioritisation of the region, only one voyage took place to Old Calabar in 1793 out of forty-seven voyages, instead thirty-six sailed to Angola where slaves were much more desirable.  In 1771 alone, 105 vessels travelled to Africa, obtaining 28,200 slaves.  In Jamaica, Liverpool trade comprised seventy-four per cent of delivered slaves and seventy-two per cent of visiting vessels. Liverpool’s dominant presence at Atlantic slave trade destinations displays the port’s numerous options, and their lack of presence at the unpopular sites displays their competent business choices.
The choice of trade goods further influenced Bristol’s success as a slave trading port. James Rogers' voyages, perhaps not entirely typical of Bristol trading, provided African merchants with East Indian and English textiles, bar iron, gunpowder, beads, hardware and liquor.  Other Bristol merchants traded with refined sugar, haberdashery, window glass, bottled beer, wrought iron, woollens, copper and brass, in return for slaves. Wales generally provided the tin and iron for Bristol’s supplies. 23] Once in Africa, in addition to slaves, Bristol merchants requested items such as wax, ivory and redwood, either for sale in the Americas or back in Bristol.  Interestingly, Bristolians sent little linen to the African coast in comparison with other slave trading ports.  Linen stood as a leading commodity in Liverpool’s choice of trading goods, giving the port a considerable advantage over Bristol. Linen formed ninety-one per cent of all British exports to North America and West Africa, which Liverpool benefited from due to its easy acquisition of Lancashire cottons and Manchester textiles. 26] Manchester’s provision of checks and silk handkerchiefs contributed to the expulsion of Bristol’s German, French and Scottish textiles from the market.  In addition to linen, Liverpool traded copper and brass from Staffordshire, salt from Cheshire, and firearms from Birmingham. Liverpool also re-exported a number of goods from East India, such as Chintz, glass beads, cotton and calicoes.  The careful assortment of trade goods meant numerous colonies demanded trade with Liverpool. A number of international conflicts severely hindered Bristol’s progress in the slave trade.
Throughout the eighteenth century conflicts existed with France, Spain and America. Bristol’s location in relation to the Bristol Channel meant a great number of vessels were lost to french privateers.  Consequently, Bristol successfully turned to privateering during the Spanish Succession from 1702 to 1713. The capture of over seventeen of its vessels by the Spaniards deepened Bristol’s involvement in privateering further during the Seven Years War (1756 to 1763). Trade with the West Indies suffered in consequence, due to the heavy amount of investment in privateers. 30] The American War of Independence and subsequent loss of American colonies hampered the triangular trade, which Bristolians heavily relied on. Shipping from the United States dropped from approximately 21,202 tons in 1773-7 to 12,326 in 1778-80.  Bristol’s slave trade experienced war in an entirely negative way during this period. On the other hand, Liverpool made substantial gains from Great Britain’s involvement in international conflicts. Williamson, an observer of the War of the Austrian Succession 1739 to 1748, stated that: “trade flourished and spread her golden wings so extensively that if they had ossessed it seven years longer, it would have enlarged the size and riches of the town to a prodigious degree” Involvement in conflicts meant that the dockyards on the River Mersey fitted out many ships in order to fill the void left by Bristol’s departure from trade. Slave trading voyages increased considerably during the wars, and vessels successfully avoided meeting French privateers due to Liverpool’s advantageous geographical location. War also enabled Liverpool merchants to take advantage of price differentials between England and the colonies.
Profits inevitably resulted, which contrasts starkly with Bristol’s experience of the wars.  Vast potential existed for profit in the slave trade, yet when factoring in costs, Bristol struggled to reap the benefits of the system. Loss of slaves in the middle passage presented one expense, as Captain Black’s letter to James Rogers depicted. His voyage lost thirteen female slaves, fifty-six males and sixteen sailors.  Bristol merchants also paid generous wages, commissions and financial incentives to captains and slave sellers in order to ensure a loyal partnership. 35] When Robert Thiennison’s brother, a cook on Rogers’ Pearle, died, he requested wages of 55 shillings for a month’s work, revealing the high wages paid by Bristolians. High duties also frustrated Bristol merchants, especially those on tobacco, which is something they specialised in.  David Richardson offers an estimated return of 7. 8 to 19. 8 per cent on Bristol voyages, however Rogers’ voyages barely managed three per cent profit, and the highest estimate still comes in lower than the profits made by Liverpudlians. 37] Liverpudlian merchants made significantly higher profits in the slave trade, primarily due to cunning commercial decisions. Manipulated stock records enabled merchants to avoid paying duties on up to twenty per cent of the tobacco shipped into the port.  Proposed estimates suggest that 100-ton ships returned profits of 750 pounds Stirling based on five Negroes per two tons.  The Liverpool vessel Lively produced a 300 per cent profit in 1737, but most voyages secured around ten per cent profit, which barely proved sufficient considering the risks involved in slaving. 40] One particular Liverpool voyage achieved a profit of 8000 pounds Stirling (before deductions for victuals and trade goods), with costs approximately comprising duties of 134 pounds, Doctor wages of thirteen pounds, Captain salary of 4 pounds per 104 made on total returns, and commission costs of 454 pounds Stirling.  Liverpudlians clearly possessed a unique capability to make large profits, despite mounting costs. The merchant oligarchy of Bristol overlooked crucial investments in port facilities in favour of spending profits on luxurious lifestyles, proving detrimental to their trade accomplishments.
Instead, investments centred around the urban “renaissance” taking place in the city, rather than focusing on shifting towards industrialisation. Prioritising Caribbean ventures over local industrial schemes demonstrates a further hindrance to the development of Bristol.  It appears that Bristolians’ preferences centred on funding a lifestyle founded on wealth and consumption, reflected in the growing local demand for sugar and tobacco. Furthermore, Bristol did not invest in the port until the nineteenth century, when developments included a floating harbour, which proved highly inefficient also. 44] Comparatively, the port of Liverpool received extensive urban development as a result of profits made in the slave trade. The city underwent considerable expansion and urban growth, facilitating merchants’ ability to exploit the Atlantic trade system and various markets. The city’s wealth stemmed from the merchants, hence their control over city developments. Subsequently, profits funded financial structures and transport networks including canals, enabling Liverpool to maintain control over sources of goods such as the salt of Cheshire. 45] Investment in the docklands proved most influential, earning Liverpool the title of largest ship construction site in England, with sixty-one of the 161 English-built slave vessels manufactured in Liverpool.  The swift response to mercantile needs and construction of the Midlands canal network resulted in the shipment of valuable, high demand trade goods to Liverpool, not Bristol. A notable shift in Bristol’s priorities may account for Liverpool’s eclipse of Bristol as the leading slave trading port in England.
The transition to specialisation in the sugar trade proves the most convincing causal factor in the reduced role in slave trading. The Bristolian pleasures derived from sugar, tobacco and snuff consumption drove merchants to focus on supplying the domestic market with what locals demanded.  The sugar industry thrived in Bristol, which is reinforced by the sustained existence of twenty sugarhouses between 1720 and 1775.  Tobacco and sugar faced restrictions regarding direct trade to foreign countries, perhaps further encouraging Bristolians to cater to local markets. 49] One argument proposes that Bristol became more conservative, simply preferring safer, more profitable trade options as they arose. A Jamaican agent noted that “Bristol…is rich enough, but don’t care to launch out much”. John Wesley, an abolitionist, also observed Bristol’s “love of money and ease”.  The increasing abolitionist environment and comparative ease of the sugar trade perhaps rendered the Bristolians content with exiting the slave trade. The lack of familial slaving dynasties and a reluctance to engage in mercantile competition with close ties offer two further justifications for Bristol’s demise in the slave trade.
Bristol failed to secure dynasties through which to pass commercial knowledge and wealth to, mainly because eighteen of the leading twenty-five Bristol merchants died as bachelors. Encouraging others to continue the slave trade proved particularly difficult. The problems faced in re-exporting tobacco presented one deterrent, and the inevitable encounters with disease on the African coast and challenges in securing return goods also discouraged new entrants to the trade.  Bristol merchants tended to form strong, friendly connections with fellow traders, making ruthless competition difficult.
To “wage war” against familial, banking or residential associates would destroy useful connections and jeopardise one’s reputation.  Liverpool merchants, on the other hand, formed strong bonds and maintained family dynasties, but did not refrain from competition, further enhancing their prominence.  The Bristol merchants experienced limitations in available market options, which presented a sizeable obstacle to success in the slave trade. Bristol traders lacked the vital trade goods necessary for securing demand from markets that would stock vessels with healthy slaves from desirable locations.
Merchants such as Rogers tended to focus on Jamaica and Grenada to sell their slaves, places whose markets displayed an aversion to slaves from Old Calabar due to their poor health and high mortality.  These detrimental oversights in buying unsuitable slave cargoes and being unaware of the slave preferences at plantations provided great motivation to move away from trading in slaves. Bristol persisted in trading commodities with Jamaica, South Carolina and Charlestown, however they gained no advantage over Liverpool or even London. 55] Furthermore, Bristol failed to respond to new markets such as the Ceded Islands including Dominica and St Vincent, leaving the opportunity wide open for Liverpool. Liverpool slave traders successfully seized every new market opportunity that arose, providing numerous market options for the diverse trade goods they supplied. After trade opened up in 1750, Liverpool launched into trade with Upper Guinea and other markets in America, where they made gains over Bristol. 56] Liverpool also possessed advantageous contacts throughout the West African coast, especially Sierra Leone.  In contrast to Bristol, Liverpool concentrated on lesser markets such as Barbados and the Leeward Islands. Barbados supplied over fifty per cent of Liverpool’s imports after 1735, closely followed by Chesapeake, the Leeward Islands and Jamaica. The range of trade goods supplied, and entrance into the trade at a time of colonial economy deceleration also enabled Liverpool merchants to almost monopolise the Anglo-American commercial market. 58] Liverpool merchants conducted business on the coast of Africa from the Senegal River to Ambriz, where healthy slave populations attribute to the demand for Liverpool commerce in a vast number of West Indian locations. With so many options for destinations to conduct trade with slaves, it is unsurprising that Liverpool ousted the port of Bristol from its dominant position. Despite the numerous causes attributed to the demise of Bristol, the inability of merchants to make economical, competent business decisions ultimately present the most significant explanations.
Bristolians paid munificent salaries to captains and crew, as well as allowing privileges, daily charges and commission payments. Captains ate and drank excessively on shore, eroding profits considerably. Less profit also resulted from fully manning vessels, with the knock on effect of needing to charge more for slaves.  Bristol merchants found themselves outbid for slaves in Old Calabar, driving them to purchase unhealthy slaves. Their condition worsened further due to cheap provisions on board.  Consequently, prices achieved in the Americas for slaves were lower.
The Bristol merchants justifiably earned a reputation as extravagant and unbusinesslike squanderers, who treated their Captains like “young gentlemen on the Grand Tour”.  A credit crisis in 1793 caused many merchants to go bankrupt, putting an end to the slave trade for the majority of Bristolians.  The lack of business acumen amongst Bristol merchants proved detrimental to their success. Conversely, the business expertise and economical ability of Liverpudlian merchants secured the city’s title of the most successful slave trading port in Europe.
Liverpool merchants trained their crew better, paid lower wages, and minimized outfitting costs. Additionally, merchants were economical by paying wages annually not monthly, and refusing cabin privileges, primages and port allowances. For example, crew ate salt beef and drank rum punch on board their vessel, compared with Bristol crewmembers’ excessive drinking of Madeira on shore.  Low expenditure enabled Liverpudlians to sell slaves for four to five pounds Stirling less than other traders, underselling Bristolians considerably. 65] Accepting Bills of Exchange avoided reliance on return goods for payment, giving flexibility to merchants, which allowed them to return direct to Africa to embark more slaves. Liverpool merchants skilfully evaded customs administrators by importing “damaged” and therefore duty free goods, and disembarking “underweight” hogsheads, only to re-export them at heavier weights.  These tricks meant payment of less duty tax, maximising profits. Resourceful and imaginative actions and decisions thrust Liverpool to record heights never reached by Bristol in the slave trade.
Liverpool’s skilful rise to prominence in the slave trade undoubtedly provides explanation for Bristol’s demise from a once eminent slave trading port. Geographical location, vessel size, voyages, trade goods, international conflicts, market destinations, and urban development all provide convincing explanations of Bristol’s fall from the position of leading British port. However, problems could easily have been overcome or averted had the Bristol merchants possessed strong business capability, judgement skills and knowledge.
Perhaps Bristol’s priorities did shift toward catering for the domestic market. Nevertheless, the Bristolians’ lack of skills and knowledge, so clearly possessed by Liverpool merchants, sealed Bristol’s demise from a once world-leading slaving port to an average sugar-importing town. Liverpool on the other hand, traded slaves on such a grand scale that it secured its position amongst Europe’s leading port towns far beyond the abolition of the slave trade. Word Count: 3,258 BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources
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Also a republication of the sentiments of several authors of note on this interesting subject: particularly an extract of a treatise written by Granville Sharpe, Philadelphia, 1771, http://www. gutenberg. org/files/11489/11489-h/11489-h. htm. Clarkson, Thomas, The history of the rise, progress, and accomplishment of the abolition of the African slave-trade by the British parliament, Vol. 1, London, 1808, http://www. gutenberg. org/files/12428/12428-8. txt. Clemens, Paul G. E. , “The Rise of Liverpool, 1665-1750”, The Economic History Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1976, pp. 211-225. Enfield, William. An essay towards the history of Leverpool, drawn up from papers left by the late Mr. George Perry, and from other materials since collected, by William Enfield. With views of the principal public structures, a chart of the harbour, and a map of the environ, 2nd Ed. , 1774. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale Group. Hyde, F. , Parkinson, B. , & Marriner, S. , “The Nature and Profitability of the Liverpool Slave Trade”, The Economic History Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1953, pp. 368-377. Jones, S. J. “The Growth of Bristol: The Regional Aspect of City Development”, Transactions and Papers (Institute of British Geographers), No. 11, 1946, pp. 57-83. Klein, Herbert S. , “The English Slave Trade to Jamaica, 1782-1808”, The Economic History Review, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1978, pp. 25-45. MacInnes, C. M. , “Bristol and the slave trade”, in Patrick McGrath (ed. ), Bristol in the Eighteenth Century, Newton Abbot, 1972. Mackenzie-Grive, Averil, The Last Years of the English Slave Trade: Liverpool, 1750-1807, London, 1941. Morgan, Kenneth, “Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century”, The English Historical Review, Vol. 07, No. 424, 1992, pp. 626-650. Morgan, Kenneth, “Bristol West India Merchants in the Eighteenth Century”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 3, 1993, pp. 185-208. Morgan, Kenneth, “James Rogers and the Bristol slave trade”, Historical Research, Vol. 76, No. 192, 2003, pp. 189-216. Morgan, Kenneth, “Shipping Patterns and the Atlantic Trade of Bristol, 1749-1770”, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3. , 1989, pp. 506-538. Richardson, David, “Shipboard Revolts, African Authority, and the Atlantic Slave Trade”, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2001, pp. 69-92. Richardson, David, “Slavery and Bristol’s ‘Golden Age’”, Slavery and Abolition, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2005, pp. 35-54. Williams, Gomer, History of the Liverpool privateers and Letters of Marque: With an account of the Liverpool slave trade, London, 1897. Williams, Eric, “The Golden Age of the Slave System in Britain”, The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1940, pp. 60-106. Websites Liverpool & The Slave Trade, http://www. liverpoolinpictures. com/Slavery_in_Liverpool. htm -----------------------  S. J.
Jones, “The Growth of Bristol: The Regional Aspect of City Development”, Transactions and Papers (Institute of British Geographers), No. 11, 1946, pp. 64; 71.  Great Britain, Parliament, An act for the better improvement of the trade to Africa, by establishing a regulated company, London, 1708, Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale Group.  Eric Williams, “The Golden Age of the Slave System in Britain”, The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1940, p. 67.  Gomer Williams, History of the Liverpool privateers and Letters of Marque: With an account of the Liverpool slave trade, London, 1897, pp. 67-468.  C. M. MacInnes, “Bristol and the slave trade”, in Patrick McGrath (ed. ), Bristol in the Eighteenth Century, Newton Abbot, 1972, p. 173.  An account of the ships employed in the African trade, London, 1713, Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale Group.  David Richardson, “Slavery and Bristol’s ‘Golden Age’”, Slavery and Abolition, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2005, p. 44; David Richardson, “Shipboard Revolts, African Authority, and the Atlantic Slave Trade”, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2001, pp. 74, 80. 8] Eric Williams, p. 69.  Averil Mackenzie-Grive, The Last Years of the English Slave Trade: Liverpool, 1750-1807, London, 1941, p. 16.  F. Hyde, B. Parkinson, & S. Marriner, “The Nature and Profitability of the Liverpool Slave Trade”, The Economic History Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1953, p372; Anthony Benezet, Some historical account of Guinea, Philadelphia, 1771.  Thomas Clarkson, The history of the rise, progress, and accomplishment of the abolition of the African slave-trade by the British parliament, Vol. 1, London, 1808. 12] David Richardson, “Shipboard Revolts, African Authority, and the Atlantic Slave Trade”, p. 77.  David Richardson, “Slavery and Bristol’s ‘Golden Age’”, pp. 42-3.  Kenneth Morgan, “James Rogers and the Bristol slave trade”, Historical Research, Vol. 76, No. 192, 2003, pp. 195, 200.  Kenneth Morgan, “Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century”, The English Historical Review, Vol. 107, No. 424, 1992, p. 641.  Similarly, South Carolinian voyages also fell by twenty-fiver per cent. Ibid. , p. 640.  Stephen D.
Behrendt, “The Annual Volume and Regional Distribution of the British slave trade, 1780-1807”, Journal of African History, Vol. 38, 1997, p. 189.  Kenneth Morgan, “Shipping Patterns and the Atlantic Trade of Bristol, 1749-1770”, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3. , 1989, pp. 515, 532.  Morgan, “Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century”, p. 641.  Stephen D. Behrendt, “Markets, Transaction Cycles, and Profits: Merchant Decision Making in the British Slave Trade”, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2001, p. 88.  William Enfield, An essay towards the history of Leverpool, 2nd Ed. , 1774.  Morgan, “James Rogers and the Bristol slave trade”, p. 197.  Morgan, “Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century”, p. 635.  Letter To Captain Richard Prankard commander of the Unity Snow to Angola, Bristol, 29 January 1732, Bristol Central Reference Library, The Jefferies Collection: Volume 13.  Morgan, “Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century”, p. 635.  Ibid. ; Eric Williams, p. 67.  Gomer Williams, p. 467. 28] Liverpool & The Slave Trade, http://www. liverpoolinpictures. com/; Enfield, p. 85.  MacInnes, p. 175.  Morgan, “Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century”, pp. 630-2.  Jones, p. 76; Ibid.  Mackenzie-Grive, p. 4.  Paul G. E. Clemens, “The Rise of Liverpool, 1665-1750”, The Economic History Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1976, p. 210.  Captain W. Black of the Ship Jupiter to James Rogers, owner of The Jupiter, 20th August 1790, James Rogers Papers, Public Record Office, C/107/12  Richardson, “Slavery and Bristol’s ‘Golden Age’”, p. 40. 36] Morgan, “Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century”, p. 645.  Morgan, “James Rogers and the Bristol slave trade”, p. 215.  Clemens, p. 215.  However, restrictions of two Negroes per ton reduced potential profits to 200 pounds Stirling per voyage. Hyde et al. , p. 372.  Liverpool & The Slave Trade, http://www. liverpoolinpictures. com.  Gomer Williams, p. 471.  Richardson, “Slavery and Bristol’s ‘Golden Age’”, p. 46-7.  Kenneth Morgan, “Bristol West India Merchants in the Eighteenth Century”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. , 1993, p. 205.  Morgan, “Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century”, p. 628.  Clemens, p. 212-7.  Herbert S. Klein, “The English Slave Trade to Jamaica, 1782-1808”, The Economic History Review, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1978, p. 42.  Richardson, “Slavery and Bristol’s ‘Golden Age’”, p. 47.  Jones, p. 71.  Morgan, “Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century”, p. 646.  Morgan, “Bristol West India Merchants in the Eighteenth Century”, p. 204.  Ibid. , p. 203.  Ibid. , p. 205.  Clemens, p. 217. 54] Morgan, “James Rogers and the Bristol slave trade”, pp. 205, 209, 215.  Clemens, p. 219.  Richardson, “Slavery and Bristol’s ‘Golden Age’”, p. 46.  Morgan, “James Rogers and the Bristol slave trade”, p. 199.  Clemens, pp. 213-8.  Behrendt, “Markets, Transaction Cycles”, p. 172.  Gomer Williams, p. 471.  Morgan, “James Rogers and the Bristol slave trade”, pp. 196, 203.  Mackenzie-Grive, p. 4.  Morgan, “Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century”, p. 633.  Gomer Williams, p. 471; MacInnes, p. 170.  Ibid. , p. 470.  Clemens, pp. 215, 221.